BEFORE THE BOARD OF POLICE AND FIRE COMMISSIONERS
OF THE CITY OF MADISON

Debra H. Amesqua,
Complainant

vs.

DECISION AND ORDER

Firefighter Ronnie B. Greer,
Respondent

Synopsis

This case, filed on July 28, 1997, is the fifth statement of charges against
Ronnie B. Greer filed by a fire chief with this Board. This complaint alleges
violations of four department rules and of a city of Madison administrative
memorandum. Following extensive hearings and deliberations the Board has found
Respondent Greer culpable on all counts as alleged, and imposes on each count the
penalty of discharge from the fire service.

Procedural Background

This matter comes to us on a Statement of Charges by Debra H. Amesqua, Fire Chief
for the City of Madison, against Firefighter Ronnie B. Greer, filed with the
Board on July 28, 1997. Five separate counts of the charges allege violations
of the rules of the Madison Fire Department and of Administrative Procedure
Memorandum 3-5 of the City of Madison. Chief Amesqua has been represented by
Assistant City Attorney Rick Petri. Respondent Greer has been represented by
Attorney Michael Dean.

After preliminary proceedings we first convened an Evidentiary hearing on
September 29, 1997, recessing and reconvening for several sessions over several
months. Testimony was closed on March 19, 1998, and the parties stipulated to a
briefing calendar for final arguments. We received the final briefs of the
parties on May 26, 1998, as scheduled. Briefs were distributed to commissioners
for individual review prior to deliberation; we have also had individual
reference access to the complete hearing transcript of 642 pages and to the 88
marked exhibits. Commissioners reconvened for deliberations on several occasions
and have unanimously reached the decision which we announce in this document.

In our deliberations we have thoroughly reviewed the record, although it has not
been practical to refer specifically to each exhibit in this decision; we have
carefully weighed the credibility and demeanor of all witnesses, although it has
not been practical to describe in detail how each element of our decision
reflects each judgment. In general, we have found that the evidence sustains
the charges brought by Chief Amesqua, and we have rejected the constitutional
arguments and defenses proposed by respondent.

Our disciplinary decisions are subject to 62.13, Wisconsin Statutes, as amended
notably by 1993 Wisconsin Act 54, effective November 24, 1993. That amendment
set forth in an entirely new subsection the standards which the Board must use
in imposing discipline, summarized generally as "just cause" and known
colloquially as the "seven standards:"

\[ WS 62.13 \]
(1) No subordinate may be suspended, reduced in rank, suspended
and reduced in rank, or removed by the board under par. (e), based
on charges filed by the board, members of the board, an aggrieved
person or the chief under par. (b), unless the board determines
whether there is just cause, as described in this paragraph, to
sustain the charges. In making its determination, the board shall
apply the following standards, to the extent applicable:

1. Whether the subordinate could reasonably be expected to have had
knowledge of the probable consequences of the alleged conduct.
DECISION ORDER, Page 2.

2. Whether the rule or order that the subordinate allegedly violated is reasonable.
3. Whether the chief, before filing the charge against the subordinate, made a reasonable effort to discover whether the subordinate did in fact violate a rule or order.
4. Whether the effort described under subd. 3. was fair and objective.
5. Whether the chief discovered substantial evidence that the subordinate violated the rule or order as described in the charges filed against the subordinate.
6. Whether the chief is applying the rule or order fairly and without discrimination against the subordinate.
7. Whether the proposed discipline reasonably relates to the seriousness of the alleged violation and to the subordinate’s record of service with the chief’s department.

On their face these standards seem designed to guide a review of discipline previously imposed, even though it is our statutory task to consider the initial imposition of discipline. The statute directs us to follow the seven-standards “to the extent applicable.” Whenever we deliberate within the framework of the seven standards we must struggle to conform our decision-making to the rigid and sometimes inappropriate statutory instructions. In this decision, after addressing preliminary matters, we summarize our examination of each the counts of the Statement of Charges in the light of each of the seven standards.

Decision

Preliminary Matters: Motion for Recusal

In a written motion dated September 28, 1997, Respondent sought recusal of the commissioners. We took this motion under advisement during the course of the proceedings. We now deny the motion. We are confident that individually and as the duly appointed Board we have and will exercise our judgment on the basis of the evidence adduced in this case, acting fairly, impartially, and in good faith, in accordance with the standard articulated for us by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State ex rel. Richey v. Neenah Police and Fire Commission, 48 Wis.2d 575, 185 NW2d 743 (1970). Without discussing fully all issues and challenges proposed by Respondent’s argument in support of the motion to recuse, we observe the following:

1. Three of the five commissioners participating in this case have acted on at least one previous statement of charges against this respondent. WS 62.13 clearly envisages that the Board will act in all cases brought to it, including multiple cases against the same respondent; in fact we are specifically instructed by the statute to consider the record of a respondent in weighing discipline. Knowledge of previous cases does not disqualify us from making fair and informed factual decisions on the evidence before us.

2. Respondent notes that three current commissioners were defendants in a Wisconsin Equal Rights Division proceeding in which a probable cause finding was issued. Respondent neglects to note that the ERD proceeding was subsequently dismissed without prejudice.

3. Respondent’s motion papers characterize his own testimony in a previous proceeding as “attacks on the integrity of the PFC.” We are puzzled by this characterization. He has expressed dissatisfaction with the Wisconsin statutory plan for governing personnel matters of police and fire departments; he believes that commissioners appointed by a mayor as our statute requires cannot fairly handle both hiring and disciplinary responsibilities. These views are not personal attacks on the current commissioners.

4. This Board is the only body which may properly hear these charges. Recusal en banc would deprive the City, the public, this complainant, and any other prospective complainant of any proper venue or channel of accountability.

Amesqua v. Greer.max
The disciplinary decisions of this Board are subject to unusually broad judicial review. Under current review standards established at WS 62.13(5)(i), the ultimate responsibility of this Board is the compilation of a record available for thorough review in Circuit Court, which does not merely affirm or overrule our decision but which answers independently the question: "Upon the evidence is there just cause...to sustain the charges against the accused?" This remarkable scope of review provides sufficient recourse to this respondent for any possible hypothetical bias of this Board.

Preliminary Matters: Evidentiary Rulings

(1) At an early point in the evidentiary proceedings we advised respondent's counsel that we would accept a written offer of proof pertinent to several rulings excluding evidence or lines of inquiry proposed by respondent. Respondent has filed his offer during the course of the post-evidentiary briefing.

(2) We take notice of the records of prior cases before this Board in which respondent has been a party, for the limited purposes of considering respondent's knowledge of department rules and his record of service and weighing the appropriate penalty.

Charges

The Complaint recites Rule 51, which is a basic, general statement of the duties of employees to know and obey the rules and orders of the department. We do not construe the Complaint or the evidence as establishing a violation of Rule 51 distinct from violations of the more specific rules which we identify for the purposes of this decision as "counts" of the Complaint. All counts address the conduct of respondent in disseminating a document entitled "New Release/Homosexual Chief rewards Homosexual Chief for Assault," received in evidence as Exhibit 7. Respondent in his Answer dated August 28, 1997, and at hearing did not dispute his authorship and initial distribution of Exhibit 7 to the Madison Capital Times newspaper in which it was ultimately reported, but he disclaimed responsibility for subsequent news coverage and asserted several defenses based on the United States and Wisconsin constitutions.

Count A, Rule 51: Officers and members shall at all times conduct themselves so as not to bring the Department in disrepute.

General Comments: We construe this rule to prohibit conduct which might reasonably be expected to bring the department into disrepute. We do not require proof of actual damage to the department's reputation.

The Seven Standards

1. Whether the subordinate could reasonably be expected to have had knowledge of the probable consequences of the alleged conduct. The department rules are basic, long-standing, and well known. Respondent has been brought before the Board for violations of these rules in at least four previous cases (Roberts v. Greer, October 1987, "Greer I;" Roberts v. Greer, August 1993, "Greer II;" Roberts v. Greer, November 1994, "Greer III;" Amesqua v. Greer, February 1997, "Greer IV."). Respondent's unique history has acquainted him fully with the rules and with the consequences of violations.

2. Whether the rule or order that the subordinate allegedly violated is reasonable. Respondent does not argue that this rule is unreasonable on its face, and seems implicitly to accept the reasonableness of the rule per se in his argument about its application to his situation. In his defense before this Board in Greer II, respondent stipulated to the reasonableness of Rule 51. We do not presume that he is bound now by that stipulation, but we do conclude that Rule 51 is reasonable. The department and City have a valid interest in the good reputation of the department, which is essential to the internal life of the department as well as to public confidence in and support of department operations.

Amesqua v. Greer.max
Respondent's defense on this count first raises the constitutional issues which come into sharper focus on later counts. In short, respondent claims the right to speak freely despite apparent violation of Rule 51 and other standards, because his speech alleges serious official misconduct. We don't think his allegations provide the shield he needs and claims for this and later counts.

We do not claim judicial expertise in constitutional analysis and deal primarily with the factual and practical aspects of the matter. We realize that our role as the initial, quasi-judicial tribunal in disciplinary matters may require us to weigh the interests of the respondent in commenting on public affairs against the public employment interests of the department, and from time to time we have engaged in this balancing test, identified usually withPickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 n.17 (1968). In fact, we were required to conduct this balancing test in this respondent's immediately prior cases before us, Greer III and Greer IV, in which respondent advanced constitutional defenses to various charges. This Board also considered this balance of interests in Durkin v. Gilbert, in which we confirmed the validity of APH 3-29 (now APH 3-5) and were affirmed upon judicial review.

Our understanding of the constitutional defense claim may be reformulated under the Pickering analysis in these terms: Firefighter Greer's interests in expressing his views regarding department management were remote, largely personal, and insignificant in comparison to the legitimate interests of the department and the public in maintaining orderly administration of department affairs and a harassment-free work environment for all department employees.

The limited weight to be accorded to Greer's interests is reflected in several factors. In context, his remarks are shallow, uninformed and uninformative, not based on direct knowledge or claims of direct observation, and are essentially derivative descriptions of events in which he was neither a party nor an observer. In form, his remarks did not take any available constructive avenue of complaint or grievance reasonably calculated to initiate positive action, response, or even debate by the department or city officials, but were merely a gratuitous "news release." In context, his remarks were released during the pendency of prior, well-publicized charges before us (Greer IV) and refer specifically to his own plight as the subject of department discipline. Thus, even though Greer claims to address public concerns regarding the fairness of fire department management practice -- a claim which we acknowledged in our evidentiary rulings on complainant's motion in limine -- their contribution to the topic is negligible and deserves little weight in comparison to the legitimate public and governmental interests expressed in the department rules, APH 3-5, and in these charges.

We are especially mindful of the need for mutual respect and unit cohesion in the demanding context of emergency services; historically described as para-military, the
police and fire departments simply must work with trust, cooperation, and responsiveness. The public interest in the efficient functioning of this workplace is exceptionally vital. This comparison of interests is sufficient to reject the constitutional defense.

This standard poses serious technical difficulties if taken literally. This Commission does not, of course, sit to review the decision of the Chief. Surely our evidentiary hearing must be understood as the primary vehicle by which to determine whether the respondent did in fact violate a rule or order. Yet this standard and the standards following it are phrased in terms of review of the Chief's pre-hearing conduct, that is, her charging decision. We would prefer to construe this relatively new statute as consistently as possible with our straightforward conventional duty to try the case filed against respondent and not undertake a new responsibility of reviewing the charging procedures and decisions of complainants. Yet these standards 3. through 7. seem to direct our attention to the internal procedures of the department and the pre-hearing decisions of the Chief. (These standards are even more anomalous when we hear charges brought by citizen complainants.) Perhaps these standards also imply a duty explicitly to examine our own proceedings. We conclude that we must make a three-fold determination:

1. The evidence has demonstrated clearly and to our satisfaction that Chief Amesqua and the department conducted a reasonable investigation before filing these charges. We are fully satisfied that the investigation constituted at least a reasonable effort to discover the facts of the matter, and whether respondent did in fact violate a rule or order, including Rule 51. We note that this effort by the chief probably justifies the statement of charges under the analysis of constitutional claims adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Waters v. Churchill, 511 US 661 (1994).

2. We believe that our own proceedings have constituted a reasonable effort to determine the merits of the charges.

3. As we have discussed in our general comments, above, we have been persuaded by the evidence that respondent violated Rule 51.

We refer back to our discussion of the ambiguities of the seven standards as guidelines for our initial, non-apppellate disciplinary decisions. We have determined that:

1. The Chief's investigation was fair and objective, following all customary and established procedures for pre-determination review, representation by advocate or counsel, and disclosures.

2. We are fully satisfied that our own proceedings have been fair and objective. We conducted numerous hearing sessions over many months, compiling 543 pages of transcript and 80
DECISION ORDER, Page 4.

offered exhibits, plus an elaborate written offer of proof filed by respondent. We have listened attentively, read carefully, and deliberated thoroughly and at length before reaching our decisions on each of the allegations.

Standard 5. is the one of the seven standards which goes most directly to the issue of culpability, and in doing so it poses an additional interpretive challenge. Substantial evidence is a conventional formulation of an appellate review standard, and in this context reinforces an inappropriate view of our process as an appellate process rather than an initial imposition of discipline. The burden of proof to be applied by Commissioners under WS 62.13(5) prior to 1993 Wisconsin Act 54 was well established as the “preponderance of the evidence,” which is the usual minimum civil burden of proof but which is also significantly greater than “substantial evidence.” Should we conclude that the seven standards lowered the burden of proof?

We decline to do so, at least until so directed by the body of judicial authority which will be evolving as cases authored under WS 62.13(5) (am). We believe should be subject to discipline without a showing of culpability by a preponderance of the evidence. To do so would probably be unconstitutional even if authorized on the face of the statute. We determine as follows:

1. We have concluded that Chief Amesqua discovered substantial evidence that respondent violated department rules, including Rule 51.

2. We have concluded that substantial evidence constituting at least a preponderance of the evidence in our proceedings has demonstrated that respondent prepared and distributed Exhibit 7; indeed, respondent acknowledges doing so. We have also concluded that respondent’s actions violate Rule 51. Exhibit 7 recalls for us the spirit of the outbursts, insubordination, yelling, door slamming and general pique which led to discipline in Greer III and Greer IV.

We refer back again to our discussion of the interpretive difficulties posed for us by the seven standards. We have determined that:

1. Chief Amesqua has applied Rule 51 fairly against respondent and without discrimination. We find no support anywhere in our record for any contrary conclusion.

2. In acting under and applying Rule 51 we are acting fairly and without discrimination.
We are not obliged to impose the same discipline as proposed by a complainant, whether Chief or citizen. In those cases where we disagree with a proposed discipline, or where no specific discipline is proposed, it might be clearer that this standard guides our own decision rather than a hypothetical review of the complainant’s proposal. This Statement of Charges seeks discharge as a general penalty for all counts but does not specify a separate proposed discipline for each count. As penalty for the violation of Rule 51 set forth in Count A we impose the penalty of separation and discharge from the service.

In making this determination we have considered respondent’s record of service but find nothing there which ameliorates the gravity of his misconduct. On the contrary, and as we noted in our decision in Greer IV imposing a substantial suspension, we find respondent’s record of discipline generally, and before this Board in particular, to be uniquely abysmal and disheartening. The current case is now the fifth time that respondent has been before this Board on charges brought by a Chief, all of which have been meritorious. As we noted in our decision in Greer IV, Greer’s record in those cases and in other respects reflected in this record shows persistent incapacity to conform himself consistently to the appropriate requirements of ordinary civil conduct reasonably expected of any public employee, especially a sworn fire officer. In attempting to impose suspension in her letter of November 27, 1996..., Chief Amesqua encouraged respondent to improve his conduct and cautioned him that future misconduct would result in more serious penalties. We are not overly confident that this discipline will accomplish a change in respondent’s pattern of conduct.” Four Board suspensions are enough. As we warned respondent in our previous decision, we will not suspend him again.

COUNT B. RULE 18 Respect for superiors: Members shall...treat their superiors with respect... Members...shall conform to the rules and regulations of the Department, observe the laws and ordinances, and render their services to the city with zeal, courage and discretion and fidelity.

General Comments: Respect does not require unquestioning acceptance of all actions by all superiors, but does require conforming affirmatively to the rules and regulations. Rule 18 does not mean merely avoiding direct violations of prescriptive standards but also calls for constructive use of channels and means of criticism.

The Seven Standards: We refer back to our general comments about each of the standards in our discussion of the first count and add here only additional comments related to the second count.
We have determined that the elements of standards 1. 
through 4. have been established. Our view of 
respondent's constitutional claims for disrespectful 
speech is essentially the same as our view of his claims 
under Count A, Rule 51.

As noted, the critical factual elements of respondent's 
conduct are thoroughly established and clear on the 
record.

We refer to our prior general discussion of this 
standard. We find no credible suggestion or evidence 
that the chief seeks to apply these rules in any 
inappropriate way to or against this respondent.

As we noted, the statement of Charges does not propose 
or recommend a penalty specifically for each count. We 
have weighed this violation carefully, giving weight to 
the persistence of respondent's disrespectful conduct 
over several years as reflected in his cases before this 
Board. For his violations pertaining to Count B of 
these charges we impose the penalty of separation and 
discharge from the service.

Count C. Rule 39: Members must conform to and promptly and cheerfully obey all 
laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, and orders, whether general, special or 
verbal, when emanating from due authority. They shall be strictly on time to the 
minute, and obedience must be prompt, implicit, unqualified and unequivocal.

The Seven Standards. We refer back to our general comments about each of the 
standards in our discussion of the prior counts and add here only additional 
comments related to the third count.

1. Whether the 
subordinate could 
reasonably be expected to 
have bad knowledge of the 
probable consequences of 
the alleged conduct.

2. Whether the rule or 
order that the 
subordinate allegedly 
violated is reasonable.

3. Whether the chief, 
before filing the charge 
against the subordinate, 
made a reasonable effort 
to discover whether the 
subordinate did in fact 
violate a rule or order.

4. Whether the effort 
described under subd. 
1. was fair and 
objective.

5. Whether the chief 
discovered substantial 
evidence that the 
subordinate violated 
the rule or order as 
described in the 
charges filed against 
the subordinate.

6. Whether the chief 
is applying the rule or 
order fairly and 
without discrimination 
against the 
subordinate.

7. Whether the 
proposed discipline 
reasonably relates to 
the seriousness of the 
violated violation and 
the subordinate's 
record of service with 
the chief's department.

dc12
We refer again to our previous comments about standards 1. through 6. We have determined that the elements of these standards have been established. We add that Rule 39 reasonably affirms the positive duty of sworn fire officers to act constructively and affirmatively within the framework of department rules and procedures. The chief's procedures and conclusions were reasonable, fair, and objective, and are supported on the record in our proceedings.

As before, the Statement of Charges does not specify a proposed penalty for this violation. We impose the penalty of separation and discharge from service.

Count D, Rule 65: Employees shall not harass co-employees because of their sexual orientation either by the use of derogatory verbal or written comments, graphic materials, gestures or conduct which would interfere with the performance of their duties. “Sexual orientation” means having a preference for heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, having a history of such a preference, or being identified with such a preference.

General Comments: The gravamen of this charge is that Greer's accusations of wrongdoing against several department managers ("derogatory verbal or written comments") were attributed in two instances to sexual orientation.

The Seven Standards

1. Whether the subordinate could reasonably be expected to have had knowledge of the probable consequences of the alleged conduct.

2. Whether the rule or order that the subordinate allegedly violated is reasonable.

We refer again to our previous comments about standards 1. through 6. We have determined that the elements of these standards have been established.

Rule 65 is a reasonable administrative expression of non-discriminatory public policy.
3. Whether the chief, before filing the charge against the subordinate, made a reasonable effort to discover whether the subordinate did in fact violate a rule or order.

4. Whether the effort described under subd. 3. was fair and objective.

5. Whether the chief discovered substantial evidence that the subordinate violated the rule or order as described in the charges filed against the subordinate.

Exhibit 7 accuses several individuals of highly improper conduct. The misconduct of two of those individuals is attributed to their sexual orientation. The Exhibit 7 on its face constitutes sexual harassment of those two individuals under Rule 65.

Respondent claims constitutional privilege for his accusations because official misconduct is a serious matter of public concern. However, we do not perceive an all-inclusive constitutional permit for critical, derogatory, or insubordinate comments merely because the disrespect runs deep enough. Respondent's "news release" claims no particular knowledge or information about the incidents underlying the accusations; respondent took no appropriate or constructive steps to initiate or support a serious investigation or review of the accusations. The interests of the department, the city, and the public generally reflected in Rule 65 easily outweigh the constitutional claims for Exhibit 7. The department and the city reasonably may enforce Rule 65 against their employees under these conditions.

We refer to our prior general discussion of this standard. We find no credible suggestion or evidence that the chief seeks to apply these rules in any inappropriate way to or against this respondent.

6. Whether the chief is applying the rule or order fairly and without discrimination against the subordinate.

7. Whether the proposed discipline reasonably relates to the seriousness of the alleged violation and to the subordinate's record of service with the chief's department.

As we noted, the Statement of Charges does not propose or recommend a penalty specifically each count. For his violations pertaining to Count D of these charges we impose the penalty of separation and discharge from service.

Count E, APH 3-5: APH 3-5 is a three-page document attached as an appendix to this DECISION AND ORDER.

General Comments We have concluded that the preparation and distribution of Exhibit 1 violated APH 3-5.

The Seven Standards

1. Whether the subordinate could reasonably be expected to have had knowledge of the probable consequences of the alleged conduct.

APH 3-5 is a city-wide policy first promulgated in 1980 as APH 3-29, implementing City ordinances, and has been the basis of Board discipline. The City and the Department have periodically restated APH 3-29 and have conducted employee training on it. Respondent has participated in such training and received a copy of the memorandum.
Since original promulgation this memorandum has provided a practical, balanced, and effective regulation of the manner, occasion, and time of public employee conduct and speech. This Board implicitly accepted the reasonableness of APM 3-29 in deciding Durkin v. Gilbert (see Exhibit 53) and our decision was upheld on appeal to Dane County Circuit Court. We have confirmed our view that APM 3-5 is a reasonable and appropriate balancing of public and individual interests, intended and effective in accomplishing valid policies of nondiscrimination and diversification in public employment with minimal infringement on personal or political activities. The basic but abstract legal prohibitions of discrimination would be empty platitudes without the practical mechanisms and guidance for the workplace of APM 3-5 or similar policy statements; the City an employer would be negligent toward the law if it did not both provide positive leadership and enforce boundaries to conduct affecting the workplace environment of employees of protected classes.

As before, we have concluded that standards 3. through 6. have been met.

The harassing character of Exhibit 7, and specifically its contribution to a harassing work environment, are apparent to a reasonable reader. The harassing effect of the exhibit includes, for example, the potential for exposing the individuals mentioned to contempt, ridicule, and distrust by co-workers and the public due to respondent's allegations regarding such persons' conduct and sexual orientations.

As penalty for the violation of APM 3-5 set forth in Count E we impose the penalty of separation and discharge from the service.
Order

Pursuant to 62.13(5)(a), Wisconsin Statutes, we order as follows:

1. As penalty for misconduct alleged in Count A of the Statement of Charges, Respondent Firefighter Ronnie B. Greer is separated and discharged from the Madison Fire Department, effective immediately.

2. As penalty for misconduct alleged in Count B of the Statement of Charges, Respondent Firefighter Ronnie B. Greer is separated and discharged from the Madison Fire Department, effective immediately.

3. As penalty for misconduct alleged in Count C of the Statement of Charges, Respondent Firefighter Ronnie B. Greer is separated and discharged from the Madison Fire Department, effective immediately.

4. As penalty for misconduct alleged in Count D of the Statement of Charges, Respondent Firefighter Ronnie B. Greer is separated and discharged from the Madison Fire Department, effective immediately.

5. As penalty for misconduct alleged in Count E of the Statement of Charges, Respondent Firefighter Ronnie B. Greer is separated and discharged from the Madison Fire Department, effective immediately.

Approved following deliberations, and filed with the Secretary this 3rd day of July, 1998:

NADIRSON BOARD OF POLICE AND FIRE COMMISSIONERS

Alan Seeger, President
Byron Bishop, Vice-president

Margaret McGuray, Secretary
Lynn Bobbie, Commissioner
Homic Mendoza, Commissioner

distribution:

Ronnie B. Greer
Atty. Michael B. Dean
CA Eunice Gibson
Atty. Rick Petri

A-52