The Ghost of Council Past
postedExamining the Independence of the Independent Monitor
Let's go back to 2020: The Ghost of Council Past.
In 2020, the City established an Alder Workgroup to develop logistics and operational details for independent civilian oversight of the Madison Police Department (MPD).
When we look at the Workgroup's official charge, the intent is clear: independence from MPD. The language does not extend that independence to City Agencies or the City Council.
Why does this distinction matter?
Independence from MPD is not the same as independence from the City process or the City Council; the Workgroup's charge was simple and to the point. Conversations may have been intended to stretch the Monitor's independence. Still, the ordinances presented to the 2020 Council narrowed the scope of independence to the duties and responsibilities as outlined in MGO 5.19. With a few exceptions, Alders from The Ghost of Council Past understood the scope of the language. As Alders, we don't vote on feelings or hopes unless they're part of the legislative file.
Since I became an Alder in 2021, a community group supported by a couple of former Alders has run a campaign to undermine the ordinance language, make false claims about independence, and create an atmosphere of zero accountability, community confusion and mistrust, and endless interagency conflict. Unable to validate their claims with the ordinance, they have orchestrated relentless attacks on City staff, intending to smear their reputations and build support for their feelings and hopes to be adopted as a vote on the Council floor.
We should be able to debate the structure, authority, and effectiveness of civilian oversight based on oversight best practices and the ordinance itself. The narrative that goes beyond the original charge has harmed the people most impacted in our community and contributed to nearly six years of dysfunction, delays, and a lack of trust.
Let's return to the record.
RES-20-00459 | Legistar ID 60764
The Alder Workgroup to Develop Logistics & Operational Details for MPD Independent Civilian Oversight was charged with:
These were the four stated objectives. The charge specifically called for independent civilian oversight of the MPD. It did not say the oversight structure would be separate from and independent of the City of Madison or the Common Council.
The work:
The Workgroup included three alders: Shiva Bidar, Rebecca Kemble, and Donna V. Moreland. Dr. Karen Kapusta-Pofahl, Assistant City Attorney Marci Paulsen, Assistant City Attorney John Strange, and City Attorney Michael Haas supported its work.
I watched the Workgroup meetings to understand how the ordinance developed and why its language did not always seem to align with the claims about the oversight structure.
I learned the ordinance developed during a period of significant public concern about policing, circumstances that, in many ways, resemble those we face today. I believe the 2020 council was responding to the public with a solution to public demands for police accountability.
Although the result was imperfect, it was meant to improve trust and bring impactful changes to policing. In conversations with other Alders, I have heard that the expectation was to implement the ordinance, evaluate it, and modify it as needed to strengthen the system. However, the same group making the full independence claims has campaigned against every attempt to clarify the ordinance.
Here is how to find the meetings in Legistar, along with links to the meeting recordings:
- Workgroup's Legistar page
- From the Meeting tab, select 2020 from the "Date" dropdown list
Ordinances: What Does Independence Mean?
When raising the questions about independence, we shall look at the ordinance.
- MGO 5.20(1), first line of the ordinance, states: "A Police Civilian Oversight Board ("Board") is hereby created for the City of Madison."
- MGO 5.20(2) further describes the Board as a body that operates "within the City of Madison" and "is independent from the MPD."
This wording matters. The ordinance identifies the Board as a City body independent of the Police Department. It does not describe the Board as a separate legal entity independent of the City.
On the other hand, the language in MGO 33.20 establishes the Madison Cultural Arts District Board and "authorized the creation of a special purpose district that is separate and distinct from, and independent of, the City." This language doesn't appear in MGO 5.19 or 5.20.
The Monitor's employment and reporting structure
The Monitor is classified as a managerial employee under MGO 3.54(9), with a specific exception: the Police Civilian Oversight Board recruits, hires, and supervises the Monitor. No other exceptions to independence were made in this clause either. (MGO 5.19(2))
However, the Board's authority is also limited by MGO 5.19(4)(a), which states: "The Board shall recruit and appoint the Monitor, with the assistance of the Common Council and Office of Human Resources."
MGO 5.19(4)(b) further provides that "The appointment of the Monitor by the Board shall not be effective unless and until confirmed by the Common Council."
The ordinance does not remove the Council from the appointment process or give the Board exclusive authority over the Monitor's appointment. Instead, it establishes a shared process with a clear accountability mechanism: the Board recruits and selects a candidate, the Council and Human Resources assist in the process, and the Common Council must confirm the appointment before it becomes effective. The ordinance explicitly requires the Council's confirmation, making the Council the final decision-maker on whether the appointment takes effect.
MGO 5.19(6): Independence of the Monitor
1. MGO 5.19(6)(a): Independent from MPD
The OIM must remain sufficiently independent from MPD to prevent the two from becoming so closely aligned that the OIM cannot effectively fulfill its duties. The ordinance gives a practical example: the OIM must not be physically located in the same office as MPD management, officers, or other personnel.
This provision directly addresses independence from the Police Department and reinforces the Workgroup's objectives.
The ordinance mentions no independence from the City or Common Council; for example, the OIM office shares a wall with the Council Office today, creating proximity between the agencies, which contrasts with the ordinance example used to address MPD's independence.
2. MGO 5.19(6)(b): Independent from City Staff and Officials
The ordinance also states: "No City employee or official shall attempt to use their political or administrative position to unduly influence or undermine the independence of the Monitor or any employee of the OIM in the performance of their duties and responsibilities as set forth in this Ordinance."
This section identifies both a protection for the Monitor and a limit on the conduct prohibited.
- Who? City employees or officials.
- How? By using their political or administrative position.
- To do what? "Unduly influence or undermine the independence of the Monitor or OIM employees."
- In what context? In the performance of their duties and responsibilities as set forth in this ordinance.
The full sentence matters; it protects the Monitor and OIM staff from undue political or administrative interference in their assigned work. Advocates weaponize this clause, often leaving out: "in the performance of their duties and responsibilities as set forth in this Ordinance."
This raises the question: why insist on spreading misinformation and disinformation? At the end of the day, we all want the same thing: the "effectiveness of the Office of the Independent Monitor" as stated in 5.19 9(b) and "building and strengthening the community's trust in the MPD's services" by reviewing and making "recommendations regarding police discipline, use of force, and other policies and activities, including related to rules, hiring, training, community relations, and complaint processes", as stated in MGO 5.19 (2).
Click here for the list of duties and responsibilities under MGO 5.19 (7) Powers and Duties of the OIM and Monitor
